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THE REGULATION OF FUNDED SOCIAL SECURITY*
Deborah M. Weisst
INTRODUCTION
The Social Security system is in need of reform. Most of its
problems stem from the fact that it is unfunded; in other
words, the Social Security system uses current receipts to pay
benefits to current retirees. From the perspective of each indi-
vidual worker, the Social Security system is a compulsory sav-
ings program. Individuals pay Social Security taxes during
their working years and receive an annuity after retirement.
From the perspective of the economy as a whole, however, the
present Social Security system is not a form of savings. To
create savings in the economic sense, resources that could be
consumed now must be invested and used to produce new
output that can be consumed in the future.
The unfunded financing of the current system creates two
problems. First, national savings is lower than it would be
with a funded system. Second, the system is vulnerable to
demographic fluctuations so that small cohorts, like Genera-
tion Xers, will bear an enormous burden as they underwrite
the retirement of large cohorts, like baby boomers.
A public retirement scheme need not be unfunded. Social
Security payroll taxes could be invested in the private sector,
and the return on these investments could be used to pay the
annuities of retirees. Such a system would be called funded
Social Security. Funding the Social Security system would
solve two of the current system's principal problems, vulnera-
bility to demographic swings and its adverse effect on the sav-
ings level. However, a funded Social Security system raises
many difficult issues.'
(© 1998 Deborah M. Weiss. All Rights Reserved.
Visiting Associate Professor of Law and Olin Fellow, University of Southern
California Law School.
' Perhaps the most difficult problem arises from the fact that the United
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This Article will deal with one of those issues: A funded Social
Security system would create a huge pool of assets. Those
assets would have to be managed somehow, and this Article
examines various approaches to the management of Social
Security assets.
Any plan for managing Social Security funds must address
two basic issues: (1) the investment policy the funds should
follow and (2) who should manage the funds. These questions
are intertwined, and succeeding sections of this Article will
shift between them. Section I will examine the basic choice be-
tween active and passive investment and will argue that any
privatized Social Security system must include some form of
active management. Section II will look at who should manage
funds and propose that financial intermediaries are better
suited to this task than are individuals, government, or em-
ployers. Section III will propose a general fiduciary standard
which should be imposed on all fund managers. I will propose
a standard that modifies the current trust law prudent inves-
tor rule. Section IV will explore two methods of ensuring that
financial intermediaries actually comply with the general pro-
posed standard of prudence: (1) capitalization requirements
and other devices to ensure that fiduciaries are not judgement
proof and (2) additional restrictions on the investment policies
that fund managers may pursue. The Conclusion will evaluate
the principal reform proposals that have been recently intro-
duced into Congress.'
States cannot enact retirement income policy from a clean slate. Any shift to a
funded system would raise transition problems of intergenerational equity: either
workers during the transition period would pay two sets of taxes, or retirees
would get less than full benefits, or a combination of the two.
A second problem concerns the distributive effects of the system. The current
Social Security system redistributes income to less affluent participants. Although
a funded system could effect redistribution, none of the plans offered to date do
so. Still another set of problems concern the treatment of household labor, general-
ly by women, and the corollary issues of survivorship interests. See generally Ka-
ren C. Burke Grayson & M.P. McCouch, Women, Fairness, and Social Security, 82
IOWA L. REV. 1209 (1997).
2 See, e.g., H.R. 4076, 105th Cong. (1998) (Petri); H.R. 3560, 105th Cong.
(1998) (Smith); H.R. 3456, 105th Cong. (1998) (Kasich-Shays, Miller, Graham,
Blunt, Foley, Doolittle); S. 1792, 105th Cong. (1998) (Moynihan, Kerrey, Hollings);
H.R. 3082, 105th Cong. (1997) (Smith, Porter, Campbell, Knollenberg, Houghton,
and Sanford); H.R. 2929, 105th Cong. (1997) (Porter, Bachus, Shays, Smith,
Livingston, Petri, Sanford, Parker).
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I. SOUND INVESTMENT
A. Modern Portfolio Theory
Modern portfolio theory examines the optimal investment
strategy for a risk-averse investor, or, in other words, an inves-
tor who wishes to obtain high returns at low levels of risk.
The central insight of portfolio theory is that risk is not
additive: two properly chosen assets will generally be less risky
than either asset alone. To reduce overall risk without reduc-
ing return, investors should look for assets whose risks are
negatively correlated with each other. The precise risk of a
portfolio combining two assets depends not only on the risk of
each asset, examined in isolation, but on the correlation be-
tween the assets in the portfolio.' As long as the two assets
are not perfectly correlated, combining them can reduce portfo-
lio risk below the level of either separately.
By proper diversification an investor can eliminate some,
but not all, risk. The risk that can be eliminated is called
diversifiable risk, or alternatively, unique or specific risk.
Diversifiable risk is due to factors that are particular to a
given company or industry. These factors include how well
managed a company is, the quality and price of substitutes for
the company's product, the prices of inputs and so on. Diversi-
fication mitigates the unique risk of one asset by offsetting
that risk against the unique risk of another asset. After unique
risk has been diversified away, the remaining risk is called the
market risk. An asset's market risk is the extent to which the
asset's price moves in the same direction as the market as a
whole.4 Market risk is, in effect, the risk that the economy as
a whole will prosper or decline.
In a well-functioning asset market, the return on an asset
should not reflect the asset's unique risk, since unique risk can
be diversified away. In contrast, the return on a stock should
reflect market risk, since market risk cannot be eliminated
through diversification. Since unique risk is not compensated,
3 See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, THE PRINCIPLES OF CORPO-
RATE FINANCE 155-68 (4th ed. 1991); JAMES C. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGE-
MENT AND POLICY 60 (10th ed. 1995).
BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 3, at 163.
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no rational investor should ever bear unique risk.5 To avoid
unique risk, investors should not make low risk investments
but should choose a properly diversified portfolio. These princi-
ples have an important corollary, the so-called Separation
Theorem.6 The Separation Theorem suggests that there is a
single portfolio, called the market portfolio, that contains the
optimal combination of risky assets for all investors, regardless
of their risk preferences.
Rational investors can differ in the amount of market risk
they choose to bear, since market risk is compensated. In order
to tailor their portfolio to their individual risk preferences,
investors should vary the proportion of assets they hold in the
market portfolio and in risk-free assets, such as short-term
Treasury bills.
Proposal One
The portfolio of a funded Social Security should con-
tain the smallest possible level of unique risk.
B. Active and Passive Investment
The Separation Theorem has some important implications
for individual investment decisions. It suggests that some
investors can free ride off of the investment decisions of others
by using a passive investment strategy.
Investors using an active investment strategy investigate
stocks and choose investments on the basis of such factors as
the long-term growth prospects of the company. An investor
who uses a passive investment strategy designs his portfolio to
reproduce the stocks in an index of funds, generally a broad-
based index. The Separation Theorem implies that an individu-
al investor can reap the benefits of the active investment poli-
cies of others by using the passive index fund as the market
' See Eugene F. Fama, Risk, Return and Equilibrium: Some Clarifying Com-
ments, 23 J. FIN. 29 (1968); John Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and the
Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REV. OF
ECON. AND STAT. 13 (1965); William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of
Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964).
6 See James Tobin, Liquidity Preference as Behavior Toward Risk, 25 REV. OF
ECON. STUD. 65 (1958).
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portfolio and adjusting his total risk by combining the market
portfolio with risk-free investments such as short term Trea-
sury bills.
In designing an investment strategy for funded Social
Security, the threshold question is whether funds should be
managed actively or passively.
Passive index investing is an excellent approach, even an
optimal one, for some investors. The pension fund for federal
employees, the Thrift Savings Fund,7 has a well-designed pas-
sive index scheme.' However, the fact that passive investing
has worked well for the Thrift Savings Fund, and some other
pension funds, does not imply that it is the right approach for
a whole system of funded investing. Passive management
works only if there are active investors. Investors can be active
in two important ways. First, they can be active in the sense
that they devote time and resources to investigating various
companies in order to ascertain their value. Such efforts en-
sure that stocks are properly priced. Second, investors may
become actively involved in the management of the companies
in which they invest.9
Both types of active investing are important to the smooth
functioning of the capital market. However, ascertaining how
many active investors are needed to make the capital markets
function efficiently is a difficult theoretical and empirical ques-
tion. There is literature that suggests that, for some markets,
the requisite number of well-informed investors is surprisingly
small. These results, though, apply to markets for simple ho-
mogeneous goods like milk." Stocks, however, are a more
complex and heterogeneous commodity, and buyers must incur
higher search costs to guarantee an efficient outcome.
' Federal Employees' Retirement System Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-335, 100
Stat. 514 (1986) (codified at 5 U.S.C.S. §§ 8432 et seq. (1998)).
8 5 U.S.C. §§ 8437-39 (1998).
See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, Relational Investing and Agency Theo-
ry, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1033 (1994); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational
Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 124, 129-42
(1994).
1 See Alan Schwartz & Louis Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630
(1979).
1998]
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Indeed, an important body of research suggests that too
much index investing may cause asset markets to stop func-
tioning altogether. Trades occur only when buyers and sellers
place different values on the asset being traded. Often, such
differences will be the result of different beliefs by the parties
about the value of the asset, and such differences are in turn
the result of the parties' efforts to investigate the stocks. With
many index funds, most parties in the markets will be operat-
ing on the same strategy, lowering the volume of trading and
at some point causing the markets to stop functioning well.1
The number of investors who must be actively involved in
corporate governance is also extremely difficult to ascertain.
Many observers believe that the number of such active inves-
tors has already been reduced to a dangerously low level by
several aspects of the current regulatory regime1 2 and encour-
aging more passive investment would make a bad situation
worse.
Clearly, a funded Social Security system would be very
large, and requiring a passive investment policy would create a
significant risk of reducing both types of active investment
below the acceptable level.
Thus, I propose that any plan for a funded Social Security
system allow for at least some funds to be actively managed.
" See Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction
Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN.
ECON. 71 (1985); Thomas A. Gresik & Mark A. Satterthwaite, The Rate at Which
a Simple Market Converges to Efficiency as the Number of Traders Increases: An
Asymptotic Result for Optimal Trading Mechanisms, 48 J. ECON. THEORY 304
(1989); Paul Milgrom & Nancy Stokey, Information, Trade and Common Knowl-
edge, 26 J. ECON. THEORY 17 (1982); Robert Wilson, Incentive Efficiency of Double
Auctions, 53 ECONOMETRICA 1101 (1985). I thank Eric Talley for pointing these is-
sues out to me.
12 See, e.g, Gregory S. Alexander, Pensions and Passivity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 111, 124 (1993); Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of
Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 873-88 (1992); Bernard S.
Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 575-91 (1990);
John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corpo-
rate Monitor, 91 COLuM. L. REV. 1277, 1366-68 (1991); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director; An Agenda for Institutional Investors,
43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 882-92 (1991); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American
Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 53-65 (1991).
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Proposal Two
At least some privatized Social Security funds should
be actively managed.
II. WHO SHOULD MANAGE FUNDS?
The proposition that some Social Security funds must be
actively managed has implications for the question of who
should manage these funds. A funded Social Security system
could be either a single public fund managed by the govern-
ment or could consist of individual privatized accounts. Such
individual accounts could be managed either by individuals, by
the government, by private professional fund managers, or by
employers. In this section I will argue that the need for active
fund management dictates decentralized private accounts, and
that these funds are best managed by financial professionals.
A. The Case Against Government Management
Whether a government can successfully manage the Social
Security trust fund appears at first to be a straightforwardly
ideological issue that depends on one's views about the proper
size of government. Yet, even relatively enthusiastic advocates
of government intervention in the economy should be skeptical
about the wisdom of government-managed Social Security. A
privatized Social Security system is too large to be managed
passively without impeding the efficiency of the capital market,
but governmental agencies are unlikely to be effective active
managers. Managers will only have an incentive to invest
wisely if they are subject to market pressure from other inves-
tors competing to ascertain which stocks are the best values.
This kind of competition cannot occur with any monopoly,
whether governmental or private. Moreover, active government
investment raises the possibility of what might politely be
called cronyism. The Thrift Savings Fund for federal employees
1998]
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recognizes both these difficulties by requiring passive invest-
ment of funds 3 and precluding the exercise by the Fund or its
agents of voting rights in Fund-held equity."
For these reasons, a government-run funded Social Securi-
ty system should be unappealing even to those who believe
that governments have an important role to play in correcting
market imperfections, providing public goods, and redressing
distributional inequities. Moreover, while I will argue later
that government should play an important role in regulating
privatized Social Security, government should not attempt di-
rectly to manage Social Security investments. This in turn
implies that funded Social Security should take the form of
individual accounts.
B. The Case Against Employers as Account Managers
Eliminating government leaves three potential account
managers: individual participants; private professional fund
managers and employers. If employers are involved, they can
either manage directly or act as intermediaries between em-
ployees and professional fund managers
The private pension system provides some evidence about
employer management of retirement funds. Under ERISA,
employers are the primary fiduciaries of pension plans. The
pension experience suggests, however, two problems with em-
ployer management: lack of competence and conflicts of
interest.
1. Competence
Large employers in general do a fairly competent job of
managing their pension funds. However, small and medium
sized employers, even with the best of intentions, are not al-
ways very good at direct fund management.
These smaller plans often make investment decisions with
little guidance, and when they do consult financial advisors,
they may choose those advisors unwisely. In particular, they
often make fundamental mistakes in their asset allocation,
" See 5 U.S.C. § 8438(b)(2) (1998) (requiring index investing).
14 See 5 U.S.C. § 8438(f).
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often underinvesting in equity and overinvesting in real estate
or cash equivalents.15 In the context of ERISA, smaller firms
should be encouraged to delegate to fund managers or engage
in passive strategies. 6 However, since a privatized Social Se-
curity system would be starting afresh, there seems to be no
good reason not to eliminate employers-as-fiduciaries, using
them, at most, as conduits for contributions.
2. Conflicts of Interest
Employers of any size face conflicts of interest, and numer-
ous reported ERISA cases testify to the frequency with which
these conflicts create problems. 7 An employer-run system of
private accounts would require rules analogous to ERISA's
prohibited transactions rules. 8 The prohibited transactions
rules greatly complicate the job of active portfolio management
either by employers or by fund managers they engage. While
an ordinary fund manager must guard only against invest-
15 Deborah M. Weiss & Marc A. Sgaraglino, Prudent Risks for Anxious Workers,
1996 Wis. L. REV. 1175 (1996).
, See fd. at 1202-12.
17 See, e.g., Wood v. Comm'r, 955 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1992); Brock v. Citizens
Bank of Clovis, 841 F.2d 344 (10th Cir. 1988); Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113 (7th
Cir. 1984); Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455 (5th Cir. 1983); Donovan v.
Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1983); Cutaiar v. Marshall, 590 F.2d 523 (3d Cir.
1979); Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Bros., 20 Employee Benefits Cas.
(BNA) 1902 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Cosgrove v. Circle K Corp., 915 F. Supp. 1050 (D.
Ariz. 1995), affd, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3853 (9th Cir. Feb. 27, 1997); In re Gulf
Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D. Tex. 1991), affd sub nom. Borst v. Chev-
ron Corp., 36 F.3d 1308 (5th Cir. 1994); Brock v. Hendershott, 8 Employee Ben-
efits Cas. (BNA) 1121 (S.D. Ohio 1987), affd, 840 F.2d 339 (6th Cir. 1988); James
A. Dooley Assocs. Employees Retirement Plan v. Reynolds, 654 F. Supp. 457 (E.D.
Mo. 1987); Danaher Corp. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 633 F. Supp. 1066
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); Donovan v. Schmoutey, 592 F. Supp. 1361 (D. Nev. 1984); Sixty-
Five Sec. Plan v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 588 F. Supp. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
Donovan v. Daugherty, 550 F. Supp. 390 (S.D. Alaska 1982); McDougall v. Dono-
van, 552 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Weisler v. Metal Polishers Union, 533 F.
Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Gilliam v. Edwards, 492 F. Supp. 1255 (D.N.J. 1980);
M & R Inv. Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 484 F. Supp. 1041 (D. Nev. 1980), affd, 685 F.2d
283 (9th Cir. 1982); Marshall v. Carroll, 2 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2491
(N.D. Cal. 1980), affd, 673 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1982); Marshall v. Cuevas, 1 Em-
ployee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1580 (D.P.R. 1979); Marshall v. Kelly, 465 F. Supp.
341 (W.D. Okla. 1978); Marshall v. Snyder, 430 F. Supp. 1224 (E.D.N.Y. 1977),
affd in part and remanded in part, 572 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1978); Huge v. Old
Home Manor, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1019 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
"' See 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1998).
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ments that conflict with his own interest, an employer-spon-
sored manager must also avoid conflicts with the interests of
the employer and related parties.
Eliminating the government and employers leaves two
potential candidates to manage privatized accounts: individu-
als and professional fund managers.
C. The Case Against Individual Investment
Many workers lack financial sophistication. Evidence sug-
gests that participants in self-directed accounts unintentionally
take on unique risk. In particular, many investors, apparently
seeking a maximally risk-averse course, inadvertently assume
unnecessary unique risk by investing heavily in debt instru-
ments such as Guaranteed Investment Contracts ("GICs"),
which are fixed income assets that include no equity compo-
nent. 9 Moreover, even the more financially sophisticated em-
ployees often fall into behavioral investing traps." For exam-
ple, investors tend to look at upside and downside positions in
separate frames of reference which leads to phenomena such
as unnecessary risk-taking and overpriced downside protec-
tion.2' In addition, investors may have an aversion to regret
which is stronger when the investor takes a positive action
that fails than when the investor does nothing and passively
loses money. Such emotions discourage the investor from mak-
ing decisions in which he must take responsibility for the final
outcome and will lead to selling winners too early and riding
losers too long.22
19 See Lee Berton, Many GICs Have Lost Value, But Holders May Not Be Told,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 1995, at Cl; Karen Slater Damato, For Market-Weary, GICs
Make Sense ... or Do They?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1994, at Cl; Mary Rowland,
Waking Up Your Savings Plan at Work, N.Y. TIMEs, June 25, 1994, at A37.
2 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order,
97 COLuM. L. REV. 1519, 1557-58 (1997); Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope,
Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers
and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627 (1996).
21 See Hersh M. Shefrin & Meir Statman, Behavioral Portfolio Theory (Sept.
1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
See, e.g., Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Myopic Loss Aversion and
the Equity Premium Puzzle, 110 Q.J. ECON. 73 (1995); Daniel Kahneman et al.,
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, J. ECON.
PERSP., Winter 1991, at 193, 194; Hersh M. Shefrin & Meir Statman, Explaining
Investor Preference for Cash Dividends, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 253 (1984).
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Indeed, as Professor Kathryn L. Moore points out, there
seems to be a certain inconsistency between the paternalistic
forced savings that is at the heart of Social Security and the
assumption that individuals are competent to manage their
own investments.'
D. Professional Fund Managers
So far I have argued that neither government, employers,
nor individuals should manage a funded Social Security sys-
tem. This leaves, by default, professional fund managers as the
only potential administrators.
Proposal Three
Social Security accounts should be individualized and
managed by investment professionals rather than
participants, employers, or the government.
Almost by definition, professional fund managers-or at
least some of them-will have the expertise necessary to invest
prudently. Yet, this does not mean that they should be left to
invest individual Social Security accounts without restriction.
In the next sections, this Article will address the regulatory
regime that should be applied to the managers of individual-
ized accounts.
III. A PROPOSED GENERAL FiDucARY STANDARD
A professionally managed system could still leave room for
individuals to choose among professionally managed funds.
Indeed, since some participants will be well-informed, allowing
choice will impose a desirable degree of market pressure on
managers.
Fortunately, the Social Security system need not rely
wholly on monitoring by well-informed participants to protect
less informed participants. The Separation Theorem implies
Kathryn L. Moore, Privatization of Social Security: Misguided Reform, 71
TEMP. L. REV. 131, 132 (1998).
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that the Social Security system can impose a mild degree of
paternalism without interfering with the choices of better in-
formed participants.
As a general policy objective, managers of privatized ac-
counts should be obligated to try to eliminate diversifiable risk,
but they should be permitted to assume a wide range of levels
of market risk. This section will discuss how such a general
policy objective could be translated into a statutory standard
based on the law of trusts.
A. General Trust Law Standard
Traditional trust principles imposed two requirements on
trust investments: Those investments must be individually
prudent, understood to mean low in risk,24 and the portfolio
as a whole must be diversified.' This requirement was, in
theory, entirely independent of the prudence requirement,26 so
that trust investments were required to be both diversified and
individually prudent.
As many commentators noted, the individual prudence
requirement violated the principles of modern portfolio theo-
ry" In 1990, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts replaced the
traditional prudent man rule with a new prudent investor
rule.2" The Restatement (Third) unequivocally rejected the re-
" The traditional prudent man rule, as stated in section 227 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Trusts, required the trustee "to make such investments and only
such investments as a prudent man would make of his own property having in
view the preservation of the estate." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 (a)
(1959).
See id. § 228.
26 See id. § 228 cmt. a.
See Harry E. Bines, Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Management
Law: Refinement of Legal Doctrine, 76 CoLUM. L. REv. 721 (1976); Jeffrey N.
Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 51 (1987); Edward C. Halbach, Trust Investment Law in the Third Restate-
ment, 77 IowA L. REV. 1151, 1169-70 (1992); Paul G. Haskell, The Prudent Person
Rule For Trustee Investment And Modern .Portfolio Theory, 69 N.C. L. REV. 87,
108-10 (1990); John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust
Investment Law, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1.
28 The prudent investor "standard . . . is to be applied to investments not in
isolation but in the context of the trust portfolio and as a part of an overall in-
vestment strategy." RESTATEMENT (THmD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1990). The Reporter's
comments clearly endorse the central principle of modern portfolio theory: any
rational investor should eliminate unique risks. Id. at cmt. e. Courts have not yet
1004 [Vol. 64: 3
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quirement of individual prudence and replaced it with a re-
quirement, consistent with modern portfolio theory, that pru-
dence be evaluated not in isolation but in the context of the
trust portfolio and as a part of an overall investment
strategy.29
Abandonment of the individual prudence requirement by
the Restatement (Third) represents a clear improvement over
traditional trust law.
B. Content of Prudence Standard
The Restatement (Third) improves traditional trust law by
eliminating the individual prudence requirement. In this re-
spect it should serve as a model for Social Security privatiza-
tion legislation. However, the Restatement (Third) has at least
two potential problems as a model for Social Security: (1) the
exception for situations in which it would not be prudent to
diversify and (2) the nature of its diversification standard.
1. Problem I: "Unless Prudent Not To" Diversity
The Restatement (Second) provided a limited exception to
the diversification requirement: A trustee was not required to
diversify if "under the circumstances it is prudent not to do
so.""0 This exception, though, was carefully limited to unusual
circumstances, such as widespread economic downturns or
where trust funds were exceptionally small.3' This rule has
been retained in the Restatement (Third) and in ERISA,1
2
which contains fiduciary rules intended to follow the common
law of private trusts."
The unless-prudent-not-to exception is not self-evidently
misguided, and has created no problems in the law of trusts,
where it has remained a narrow and seldom-used exception. 4
had the opportunity to apply the Restatement (Third) standard.
219 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TRUSTS § 227 (1990).
30 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 228 (1959).
31 Id. § 228 cmt. c.
32 Employment Retirement Income Security Act, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
832 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (1994)).
3 See U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 93d Cong. 4639, 5186 (remarks of Sen.
Williams).
"' Since the rule stated in this section is an application of the general rule
1998]
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In a sense it is trivial: If nondiversification is prudent, obvi-
ously a prudent trustee should not diversify. However, this
apparently innocuous phrase has wrought havoc with ERISA
fiduciary law. In theory, ERISA requires both prudence35 and
diversification.36 In practice, judges have interpreted "unless
prudent not to" to mean that fiduciaries can either diversify or
choose individually prudent investments.37 Where plan invest-
ments can possibly be construed as individually prudent,
courts virtually never find liability.38
The reluctance of courts to impose liability for mere non-
diversification has several causes. First, ERISA contains no
general explanation of the diversification standard.39  This
lack of statutory guidance has compounded the inevitable diffi-
culties that courts have had in applying the standard." Sec-
stated in § 227, there may be special circumstances in which the trustee is ex-
cused from diversifying investments. Thus, where the trust estate is very small it
may be proper for the trustee to invest the whole or substantially the whole of it
in one security or type of security. So also, in times of crisis and general finan-
cial instability, it may be proper to invest a large portion or even the whole of
the trust estate in a single type of security such as government securities.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 228 cmt. c.
" ERISA requires fiduciaries to act "with the care, skill, prudence, and dili-
gence . . . that a prudent man acting in like capacity and familiar with such
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with
like aims." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1994); ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B).
See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C); ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C).
'7 See Etter v. J. Pease Constr. Co., 963 F.2d 1005 (7th Cir. 1992); Reich v.
King, 867 F. Supp 341 (D. Md. 1994); Lanka v. O'Higgins, 810 F. Supp. 379
(N.D.N.Y. 1992); Jones v. O'Higgins, 11 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1660
(N.D.N.Y. 1989); see also Weiss and Sgaraglino, supra note 15, at 1190-92.
"s Courts have found the diversification requirement violated in investments
that are concentrated in a limited geographic area, see Brock v. Citizens Bank,
841 F.2d 344 (10th Cir. 1988); Donovan v. Guaranty Nat'l Bank, 4 Employee Ben-
efits Cas. (BNA) 1686 (S.D. W. Va. 1983), but even this rule is not applied consis-
tently. See, e.g., Reich v. King, 867 F. Supp. 341 (D. Md. 1994); see also Weiss
and Sgaraglino, supra note 15, at 1193.
" ERISA provides no definition of diversification either in the Fiduciary Duty
or General Definitions sections. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002, 1104 (1994); ERISA §§ 401,
407.
4' Like everyone else (including generations of economists), courts do not find
portfolio theory intuitively obvious. Accordingly, they have struggled to discern
what Congress intended. In this effort, courts have looked to the statutory text
and the legislative history of ERISA, but both have proven misleading. Like the
Restatement (Second), ERISA provides that the objective of diversification is "to
minimize the risk of large losses." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C); ERISA
§ 404(a)(1)(C). "Large losses, courts seem to have reasoned, were unlikely to re-
sult from low risk investments. This is probably true, but large losses are even
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ond, a few courts are actively hostile to portfolio theory.4' Fi-
nally, courts seem unwilling to impose liability on employers
who have made a good faith effort, however much it may have
fallen short."
Perhaps a privatized Social Security system could safely
retain the unless-prudent-not-to exception. The exception has
not grown out of control in the law of trusts. In ERISA, the
problem, in part, seems to be judicial solicitude for well-mean-
ing but naive employers, a problem that would not arise if, as I
suggest, accounts are managed by professional fund managers.
On the other hand, ERISA case law has all but gutted the
diversification requirement. Since it is almost impossible to
imagine circumstances under which a retirement account
should assume diversifiable risk, I am, therefore, inclined to
leave the unless-prudent-not-to exception out of the text of any
privatization statute
2. Problem II: Nature of Diversification
The Restatement (Third) prudent investor rule requires:
"§ 227(b) In making and implementing investment decisions,
the trustee has a duty to diversify the investments of the trust
unless, under the circumstances, it is prudent not to do so."
This standard is, taken by itself, unobjectionable, but it is
incomplete. The diversification implied by portfolio theory is
more specific than the diversification of traditional trust law.
An efficiently diversified portfolio requires a very specific com-
bination of assets that takes into consideration correlations, as
well as risk and return. The Restatement (Third) notes that
investments must be evaluated in the context of the portfolio
as a whole, but the rule itself does not mention the elimination
of unique risk as the basis for evaluating the overall portfo-
lio.43 Although the Reporter's comments to the Restatement
less likely to result from a diversified portfolio. This mistake was reinforced by a
passage in the legislative history." Weiss and Sgaraglino, supra note 15, at 1193-
94.
"I See Reich, 867 F. Supp. at 341; see also Weiss and Sgaraglino, supra note
15, at 1194-95.
42 See Bisceglia v. Bisceglia, No. 92-16561, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 3370 (9th
Cir. Feb. 17, 1994); see also Weiss and Sgaraglino, supra note 15, at 1195-96.
"(a) [The prudent investor] standard . . . is to be applied to investments not
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(Third) lucidly describe the principle of eliminating unique
risks,' they disavow a commitment to any particular rule of
investing."
Privatized Social Security requires something more explic-
it. The case law under ERISA illustrates the problems that can
result from an insufficiently specific standard. ERISA in theory
imposes two basic duties on pension fiduciaries: to invest pru-
dently46 and to diversify. Where plan investments are not
individually prudent, courts have found inadequate diversifica-
tion only if the fiduciary has placed a large percentage of the
plan assets into a single investment.4"
These rules apply to all funds, whether or not they allow
workers to choose from varying investment vehicles. One po-
tential model can be found in Regulations under ERISA gov-
erning self-directed accounts. Section 404(c) of ERISA and the
Regulations under it currently permits fund managers to re-
lieve themselves of much of their fiduciary obligation by pro-
viding participants with a range of choices that meet specified
criteria. The Regulations relieve a self-directed plan of liability
in isolation but in the context of the trust portfolio and as a part of an overall
investment strategy. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1990).
"4 See id. at cmt. e. Like the Restatement, legal critics of the traditional prudent
man rule emphasized the importance of rejecting individual prudence rather than
requiring the elimination of unique risk. See Bines, supra note 27, at 721; Gordon,
supra note 27, at 51; Halbach, supra note 27, at 1169-70; Haskell, supra note 27,
at 108-10; Langbein & Posner, supra note 27, at 1.
" The comments state that the Restatement rules "are intended to reflect the
lessons derived from modem experience and research, without either endorsing or
excluding any particular theories of economics or investments." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227.
46 ERISA requires fiduciaries to act "with the care, skill, prudence, and dili-
gence ... that a prudent man acting in like capacity and familiar with such
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with
like aims." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1994); ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B).
See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C); ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C).
48 For cases finding no liability with relatively little diversification, see GIW In-
dus. v. Trevor, 895 F.2d 729, 733 (11th Cir. 1990); Jones v. O'Higgins, 11 Employ-
ee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1660 (N.D.N.Y. 1989); Sandoval v. Simmons, 622 F. Supp.
1174, 1211 (C.D. Ill. 1985); Marshall v. Glass/Metal Ass'n, 507 F. Supp. 378, 384
(D. Haw. 1980); Marshall v. Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund, 458 F.
Supp. 986, 991-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); see also Brock v. Citizens Bank, 841 F.2d 344,
346 (10th Cir. 1988); Rausch v. Damon, No. 83-1161-CV-W-8, 1984 WL 3648 (W.D.
Mo. Sept. 5, 1985) (consolidated with No. 84-0506-CV-W-8); Marshall v. Mercer, 4
Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1523 (N.D. Tex. 1983); Weiss and Sgaraglino, supra
note 15, at 1191-93.
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for poor employee investment decisions if it makes available
investment choices that, among other things, tend "to minimize
through diversification the overall risk of a participant's or
beneficiary's portfolio." The plan must provide participants
with a broad range of investment alternatives.49 At least
three of these alternatives must be diversified," and all must,
in the aggregate, enable the participant to eliminate unique
risk.5 However, each of these three in isolation need not elim-
inate unique risk, and participants can easily choose an
underdiversified portfolio. 2
The Thrift Savings Fund for federal employees displays an
oddly inconsistent attitude towards diversification. On the one
hand, it provides participants with a well-designed menu of
investment choices including a Government Securities Invest-
ment Fund, a Fixed Income Investment Fund, a Common
Stock Index Investment Fund, a Small Capitalization Stock
Index Investment Fund, and an International Stock Index
Investment Fund.53 On the other hand, it provides no mecha-
nism for encouraging, let alone requiring, employees to hold
efficiently diversified funds and even discourages optimal asset
allocation by making the Government Securities Investment
Fund the default choice54 and requiring employees who choose
other funds to sign a kind of assumption-of-risk form.5
No privatized Social Security plan should permit the unin-
tentional assumption of unique risk that can occur under the
Thrift Savings Fund or ERISA self-directed plan Regulations.
Each fund should be required "to minimize through diversifica-
tion the unique, or diversifiable, risk of a participant's or
beneficiary's portfolio."
49 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(1)-(3) (1998).
o See id. § 2550.404c-l(b)(3)(B)(1).
', See id. § 2550.404c-l(b)(3)(B)(4).
12 See id. § 2550.404c-1(f)(5).
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 8438 (b)(1), (d)(1) (1994).
" See id. § 8438 (c)(2).
5 See id. § 8439(d).
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Proposal Four
General Standard of Fiduciary Duty
In making and implementing investment decisions,
the trustee has a duty to diversify the investments of
the trust so as to eliminate unique or diversifiable
risk.
The Social Security system might, on purely libertarian
grounds, permit beneficiaries to assume unique risk. However,
the system should place obstacles in the way of those who
would choose undiversified investments. Some individuals may
deliberately choose to undertake unique risk, but many do so
under the mistaken assumption that they are choosing low risk
investments. Before individuals are allowed to opt out of the
basic diversified investment strategy, they should be required
to receive information about the rationale behind the program
and to sign elaborate consent or assumption-of-risk forms.
Unique risk, however, is not the only risk that the Social
Security system must consider. No rational investor would
assume unique risk, but investors may rationally choose differ-
ent levels of market risk; that is, they make different tradeoffs
between risk and return. At one extreme, rational individuals
may choose to invest only in Treasury bills, thus assuming no
market risk. A more typical rational investor might choose to
hold the market portfolio. A more aggressive rational investor
might choose to leverage the market risk by borrowing to pur-
chase the market portfolio. A leveraged market portfolio would
seem to defeat the purpose of a Social Security system, since
an individual could end up not only without savings but in
debt. However, although the system should probably not allow
leveraged portfolios, I am inclined, on libertarian grounds to
allow individuals to choose the level of market risk they as-
sume. In other words, individuals should be able to choose how
to allocate their portfolio between the market port folio and
risk-free assets.
Perhaps one further restriction on the assumption of mar-
ket risk might be desirable. As individuals approach retire-
ment, holding the market portfolio, without any risk-free com-
ponent, becomes more problematic. If the individual retires
during a low point of the business cycle, his portfolio's short-
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term value will be worth less than its true long-term value.
The Social Security system might, therefore, require individu-
als approaching retirement age to at least partially phase into
risk-free assets.
Proposal Five
For most of their working life, individuals should be
allowed to choose levels of market risk up to the level
of the unleveraged market portfolio. As retirement
nears, they should be required to hold some fraction of
their portfolio in relatively risk-free assets.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
A. Regulation of Qualifications and Financial Soundness of
Managers
No fiduciary standard will have much effect if trustees are
incompetent or judgement proof. In this respect the Thrift Sav-
ings Fund may provide a good model. Assets in the Fixed In-
come Investment Fund must, with a few exceptions, be chosen
by a qualified professional investment manager.56 In order to
be a qualified professional investment manager, individuals
must, roughly speaking, be subject to a regulatory regime such
as the Investment Advisors Act and meet financial require-
ments that guarantee that they are not judgement proof.57 A
56 See 5 U.S.C. § 8438 (b)(1)(B).
The term "qualified professional asset manager" means:
(A) a bank, as defined in section 202(a)(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(2)) which-
(i) has the power to manage, acquire, or dispose of assets of a plan; and
(ii) has, as of the last day of its latest fiscal year ending before the date of
a determination for the purpose of this clause, equity capital in excess of $
1,000,000;
(B) a savings and loan association, the accounts of which are insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which-
(i) has applied for and been granted trust powers to manage, acquire, or
dispose of assets of a plan by a State or Government authority having supervision
over savings and loan associations; and
(ii) has, as of the last day of its latest fiscal year ending before the date of
a determination for the purpose of this clause, equity capital or net worth in ex-
cess of $ 1,000,000;
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funded Social Security system should impose similar restric-
tions on the managers of privatized accounts.
Proposal Six
The management of individual accounts should be
restricted to managers who meet specified registration
requirements and who can be determined not to be
judgement proof.
B. Specific Asset Allocation Guidelines
Another approach to regulating privatized accounts is to
provide more specific guidelines for the investment of individu-
al accounts.
(C) an insurance company which-
(i) is qualified under the laws of more than one State to manage, acquire, or
dispose of any assets of a plan;
(ii) has, as of the last day of its latest fiscal year ending before the date of
a determination for the purpose of this clause, net worth in excess of $ 1,000,000;
and
(iii) is subject to supervision and examination by a State authority having
supervision over insurance companies; or
(D) an investment adviser registered under section 203 of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-3) if the investment adviser has, on the last
day of its latest fiscal year ending before the date of a determination for the pur-
pose of this subparagraph, total client assets under its management and control in
excess of $ 50,000,000, and-
(i) the investment adviser has, on such day, shareholder's or partner's equity
in excess of $750,000; or
(ii) payment of all of the investment adviser's liabilities, including any liabil-
ities which may arise by reason of a breach or violation of a duty described in
section 8477 of this title, is unconditionally guaranteed by-
(I) a person (as defined in section 8471(4) of this title) who directly or
indirectly, through one or more intermediaries, controls, is controlled by, or is
under common control with the investment adviser and who has, on the last day
of the person's latest fiscal year ending before the date of a determination for the
purpose of this clause, shareholder's or partner's equity in an amount which, when
added to the amount of the shareholder's or partner's equity of the investment
adviser on such day, exceeds $ 750,000;
(II) a qualified professional asset manager described in subparagraph (A),
(B), or (C); or
(III) a broker or dealer registered under section 15 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o) that has, on the last day of the broker's or
dealer's latest fiscal year ending before the date of a determination for the pur-
pose of this clause, net worth in excess of $ 750,000 . . ..
5 U.S.C. § 8438(a)(7).
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Social Security legislation should restrict the percentage of
funds that could be invested in the securities of any one issuer.
Research suggests that holding as few as twenty randomly
chosen stocks can yield most of the benefits of diversifica-
tion.58 Thus, the Social Security system might follow the ex-
ample of the current law governing mutual funds under which
a mutual fund, to qualify as diversified, may invest no more
than 5 percent of its assets in the securities of any one issu-
er.
59
Even a 5 percent limit, however, would not ensure that
Social Security investments were properly diversified. To elimi-
nate unique risk, the investment selection mechanism must
consider the covariance of each security against other securi-
ties in the portfolio.
I am reluctant to allow a government agency to set de-
tailed guidelines for the elimination of unique risk. Although
the broad outlines of sound investing are well-established, the
more specific principles evolve rapidly and do not lend them-
selves to codification in the form of regulatory guidelines.
Thus, a privatization statute probably should not attempt to
regulate investment choices at a fine-grained level. Instead,
the system should rely on the broad fiduciary requirement to
eliminate unique risk, combined with effective personal liabih-
ty for fund managers.
" See Robert A. Levy, The Prudent Investor Rule: Theories and Evidence, 1
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 12 (1994); see also Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7
J. FIN. 77 (1952).
" See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b)(1) (1994). However, mutual funds need not qualify
as diversified. A more potent inducement to diversity can be found in the tax
code. To qualify for pass-through tax treatment, the investment company must
meet a more lenient diversification requirement provided in the Internal Revenue
Code. First, with respect to 50% of the assets, no more than five percent of these
assets may be invested in securities of any one issuer. See I.R.C. § 851(b)(4)(A)
(1994). Second, no more than 25% of the value of the fund's total assets may be
invested in the securities of any one issuer. See I.R.C. § 851(b)(4)(B); see also
Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in the Creation of a Mutual Fund, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 1469, 1480 (1991).
However, not all ownership restrictions applicable to mutual funds serve legit-
imate objectives. To qualify as diversified and to qualify for pass-through tax
treatment, a mutual fund may not own more than ten percent of the voting secu-
rities of an issuer. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b)(1) (1994); see also I.R.C. § 851(b)(4)(A).
Restrictions on the ownership of issuer's voting stock, does not improve portfolio
diversification and hurts both investors and the capital market by preventing
funds from assuming control positions. See Roe, supra, at 1480.
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A less ambitious regulatory scheme would not attempt to
provide comprehensive rules for eliminating unique risk but
would require an administrative agency to set very general
guidelines for allocating assets to very broad asset groups,
such as large or small companies, and different sectors of the
economy, while explicitly allowing active management within
the classes.
The most activist approach to this problem would require
the government to inject its judgement about the proper asset
allocation scheme. I am skeptical, however, about the compe-
tence of even the best-intentioned government agency to draft
such guidelines. A less interventionist approach would man-
date that funds hold the current market-weighted shares in
various sectors. This approach, however, would tend to slow
down efficient reallocations between sectors, and thus have
some of the same drawbacks as a more detailed passive invest-
ing scheme.
The least interventionist approach would begin from the
perhaps controversial premise that large fund managers tend
not to make gross mistakes and to use their decisions as the
basis for asset allocation guidelines. These guidelines would
not attempt to identify individual stocks or indices but would
prescribe guidelines for broadly-defined asset classes such as
large companies, small companies, corporate debt and so on.
The most difficult aspect of devising these rules is choosing the
appropriate pool of large funds. No potential comparison is en-
tirely satisfactory since different funds may have different
objectives because, for example, they appeal to clienteles with
differing tax situations. The theoretical difficulties in choosing
among benchmarks may, however, be of no practical impor-
tance, since all three types of funds have remarkably similar
asset allocations. 0
" See Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra note 15, at 1206-08.
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Proposal Seven
The Social Security system should' not attempt de-
tailed regulation of investment decisions. At most,
regulations should provide maximum percentages that
a fund can invest in a single firm and provide asset
guidelines for very broad asset classes.
CONCLUSION
A funded Social Security system holds the promise of solv-
ing some of the most basic problems in the current system.
However, a funded system may cause more problems than it
solves if it is not carefully designed. This Article has consid-
ered only one of several problems posed by a transition to a
funded system, the investment policy of a funded system.
A funded Social Security system, I have argued, should
have the following characteristics:
(1) The system should consist of individual accounts;
(2) The individual accounts must be managed by investment profes-
sionals
(a) who are permitted to manage the accounts actively
(b) who are required by law to minimize to the extent possible
the level of unique risk
(c) who meet specified registration requirements and who can
be determined not to be judgement proof
(d) but who are given relatively wide latitude in investment
decisions, subject, at most, to
(i) regulations that provide maximum percentages that
fund can invest in a single firm, and
(ii) asset guidelines for very broad asset classes.
(3) Participants should be allowed to choose levels of market risk up
to the level of the unleveraged market portfolio, until retirement
nears, when they should be required to hold some fraction of their
portfolio in relatively risk-free assets.
None of the reform bills currently being considered is
wholly consistent with these principles. Several of these pro-
posals would wholly reject the model of decentralized active
investing proposed here. Some such bills would provide for a
central trust fund or set of funds, administered by a govern-
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ment appointed board of trustees.6' Others would provide for
individualized accounts, run by a central government agency
along the lines of the Federal Thrift Savings Fund.62
Other bills would, as I have proposed, create a decentral-
ized system of individual accounts run by financial intermedi-
aries. These bills do provide some regulation of the financial
soundness of fund managers, 63 although in some cases per-
haps a less satisfactory framework than the Thrift Savings
Fund model. All of these bills propose fiduciary rules which
have serious drawbacks. One bill appears simply to incorporate
(haphazardly at that) ERISA's inadequate fiduciary rules.6'
Two privatization bills would provide the following invest-
ment guidelines:
(2) criteria for secretarial approval.-the secretary may approve a
regulated investment company for purposes of this section only if-
(b) the portfolio assets of such company-
(i) replicate the assets of a broad-based index of stocks
which is approved by the secretary, or
(ii) are of a type determined by the secretary not to in-
volve high risks for the investor.'
61 See H.R. 4076, 105th Cong. (1998) (Section 2 would amend Title II of the
Social Security Act to provide for a central fund in U.S. Treasury (new 42 U.S.C.
§ 260) invested in a series of index funds (new 42 U.S.C. § 254)); see also H.R.
3456, 105th Cong. (1998) (Section 2 would amend Title II of the Social Security
Act to establish in the treasury of the United States a Social Security plus fund
like the Thrift Savings Fund (new 42 U.S.C. § 252; new 42 U.S.C. § 256)).
62 See S. 1792, 105th Cong. (1998) (Section 3 would establish a system that
explicitly followed the pattern of Thrift Savings Fund (new 42 U.S.C. § 255 (a),
(b)).
See H.R. 3560, 105th Cong. (1998) (creating new 26 U.S.C. § 408b(c)(1));
H.R. 3082, 105th Cong. (1997) ("(c) INVESTMENT REQUIREMENTS-(1) IN
GENERAL-Amounts in a personal retirement savings account may be invested
only in regulated investment companies (as defined in section 851) which are ap-
proved by the Secretary for purposes of this section."); H.R. 2929, 105th Cong.
§ 408B(b) (1997) (Porter) (Section 4., adding 26 U.S.C. § 408b):
(3) the trustee is a bank (as defined in section 408(n)) or such other per-
son who demonstrates to the satisfaction of the secretary that the man-
ner in which such other person will administer the trust will be consis-
tent with the requirements of this section.
(4) the trustee has registered with the commissioner of social security (in
such form and manner as the commissioner may require) as a trustee of
individual social security retirement accounts).
Id.
64 105 H.R. 2929, 105th Cong. (1997) (Section 4; creating new 26 U.S.C. §
408b(c)(1)(C)).
65 H.R. 3560, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 3082, 105th Cong. (1997) (creating new
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The requirement that portfolio assets "not... involve high
risks for the investor" seems to take a step backwards by en-
dorsing the focus on the portfolio reviving the individual pru-
dence rule, and it should be redrafted. The requirement that
the portfolio "replicate the assets of a broad-based index of
stocks" sounds dangerously like a passive investment require-
ment.
The fiduciary standard for any individualized Social Secu-
rity system must flatly require fiduciaries to eliminate unique
risk without tying them to a passive strategy. To be sure, some
may feel uncomfortable incorporating the technical principles
of portfolio theory into such a populist statute. However, allow-
ing unique risk exposes beneficiaries to their own limitations
as investors, and requiring passive investment, risks impeding
the capital market. The language of finance may be daunting,
but the stakes are too high to let discomfort stand in the way
of drafting the best possible statute.
26 U.S.C. § 408b(c)(2)).
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